Where are the 100? Where are the Goveners?

I wish I didn’t have to write the following, but I’m worried about what I am seeing with the DAO.

The latest Proposal #16: Tracer Growth Fund which related to 280,000,000 TCR Tokens (28% of TCR total supply) was accepted with just “9” votes (was this 9 individual voters? Possibly). Total votes 84.61k TCR.

Proposal #15: Maple Pools - Treasury Diversification which related to $1.25 million USDC was accepted with 8 votes. Total votes 76.97k TCR

I could go on and on and on.

If I am not mistaken, the number of the “100” voting in these proposals was 3 in both cases (and I was one of those 3). The rest I presume are governors.

Where are the other 97 of the “100” and where are the rest of the governors who were selected to help make these significant decisions?

Are there really only 3 of the “100” that care about how 28% of the entire TCR supply is deployed?

We need to have a serious discussion about how we can get Governors and the “100” to vote.

Should we postpone future votes until we have addressed this situation?

I can understand the hesitancy to vote when the initial Proposals required GAS to confirm, but now with Snapshot there really is no excuse.

So again, can we have a serious discussion about how to increase voting turnout.

I wish I hadn’t felt the need to write the above, but I believe we have something quite special with Tracer and I don’t want anything to jeopardize its future.


Hi there @bobbyreddog, very appreciative of the feedback you’ve given and the commitment you’ve made to govern Tracer DAO to date. I will address all of your concerns as best as I can here.

W.r.t. voter apathy, this is an issue for all DAO run projects that we are trying to solve as best as we can. Currently we have tried to lobby and rally through the following ways:

  1. We have created notification bots on Discord when new proposals have been pushed to “EOI”, “Proposal lobby” (both in Discourse) and Snapshot.
  2. We are in the process of implementing EPNS as per here: Proposal: Tracer to implement EPNS decentralized notifications. This will enable governors to sign up to receive proposal notifications.

W.r.t. the initial 100, these were anonymous claimants of the Tracer DAO contract. We can try to lobby as best as we can through our own communication channels but at the end of the day, some of these claimants may not even be involved in our community after they initially claimed. We voted in the initial 52 governors for this reason as well as further decentralising the DAO. We will soon be voting in the additional 148 governors to help with this process. We hope that with EPNS, governors will better commit to what they were voted in for, otherwise we may have a more formal chat about the conditions for which they were voted in on.

As we progress we will need people like yourself to help voice these concerns and come up with new solutions to solve voter apathy and have effective governance. An additional solution we are considering in the future includes ‘delegation of votes’. If you have any additional solutions that you feel would best help with the process, please feel free to raise them at any point.

W.r.t. postponing future votes I am against this. As an emerging DAO we need to be consistently growing. Implementing a halt on the proposal flow will inevitably stop us from growing and taking on new opportunities, especially with our Perpetual Pools financial contract launch just around the corner.

Due to your passion for the project, I would not be against you or any others notifying the community on live Snapshot proposals (i.e. a status check on the current proposal votes, lobbying other governors/TCR holders to vote with only 1 hour to go).

I’ll say this again, but please do not hesitate to provide any additional feedback you may have in the future. I’m glad we’ve got someone like you in our community that truly wants to see the success of the Tracer project. Let’s work together to make it happen.

Here’s a review of other DAOs

  1. Tracer = quorum based majority - A low quorum makes proposals very easy to pass and the system easy to attack. A high quorum makes it very difficult to pass proposals (end up chasing whales).
  2. Curve - voting power based on time-averaged liquidity provided but would like delegates for liquid democracy
  3. quadratic voting favors smaller holders and used in GitCoin to gauge matching widespread support
  4. conviction voting is time-based in long-term support recognises persistence of feelings … in theory prevents people with large stakes and strong opinions from suppressing minority voters.
  5. Holographic consensus embeds a prediction market. Predictors can stake funds for or against a proposal they believe will pass or fail with reward for right prediction
  6. Permissioned relative comparing for/against but vulnerable to attack if little oversight - it’s your job to say ‘no’ if you care.”
  7. Lazy consensus - reputation weighted veto

I also note that in the original proposal

New governors expect that any engagement will be terminated if they fail to deliver in accordance with the Deliverables specified above.

so time to implement some clawback and golden boot scheme for chair warmers?


Thanks for the analysis @drllau.

As stated in the past, we are also looking at implementing commitment voting which is a method of voting that was created by the RMIT BIH team (Service provider to Tracer DAO).

Commitment voting paper link: Commitment Voting: A Mechanism for Intensity of Preference Revelation and Long-Term Commitment in Blockchain Governance by Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, Jason Potts :: SSRN

Additionally as I stated above:

we may need to soon implement something along the lines of “some clawback and golden boot scheme for chair warmers”.


How about eliminating and taking back claimants’ TCR that haven’t participated in voting / discussing so far ?

Suppose you were the algorithmic bot Hoagcylzje … how would you set
a) threshold of participation … does a emoji count? With 100+ govenors, discussions could be crowded if everyone jumps in …
b) valid excuses/justifications … attending a furneral takes precedence over voting … so some allowance for human factors … attending 5 funerals in month might be a tad suspicious though
c) perhaps the voting is just not relevant … lacking an abstain vote because just no knowledge … it is still participation but can’t vote either way because of lack of knowledge
d) how much TCR to be clawed back?
e) if goes to 1 TCR, does that mean governor title is removed?

I think the do X get Y, with no X ← Y clawed back is logical but as always, the details matter.

There was mention of SourceCred a few months back … are there any stats of % govenors who
a) logged in
b) clicked on emoji
c) posted a reply on discord?
d) multiple sequential messages indicating high activity?

Might be useful to have a data driven policy.