GFP: Advisor Community & Content Mark11

Summary

I, Mark11 propose to be engaged to provide services in community building and engagement for Tracer DAO, to be funded by the Growth Fund.

Mark11 is a Tracer Governor and has previously worked with Olympus Finance and Inverse Finance in their community and content teams. Mark is a former regulatory lawyer and the editor of Olympus Finance focused media at the Agora Dispatch Newsletter and the Agora Podcast.

Mark has been assisting Mycelium in building out systems to on-board Tracer DAO contributors and this proposal seeks formalize an engagement to continue that activity and further efforts in building a sense of community and place in the DAO over the long term.

Remuneration

For the provision of services, I request:

  1. 900,000 TCR vested on a pro rata basis over 91 weeks, starting on the day that this proposal is executed.

Remuneration to be provided to: 0x7d3dAEC5817F7C1F94D9Df1cF217CC1365e30B3d

Deliverables

If I am engaged to provide the services described in this Proposal, I will provide the following:

8 hours per week of consultation to the Mycelium team concerning community building and contributor on-boarding in connection with development of Tracer DAO - with reasonable additional hours during peak periods;

At the end of each quarter a quarterly summary of my activities provided by Discourse to Tracer DAO community;

Regular presence in the Tracer DAO community.

Variation and Termination

  1. I, acknowledge that, if engaged, my engagement can be varied or terminated by future Proposals. However, this termination is limited to 900,000 TCR which relates to my advisory efforts; and
  2. I expect that any engagement will be terminated if I fail to deliver in accordance with the Deliverables specified above.

Conflicts of Interest

In the context of the Tracer project, conflicts of interest include:

  1. Existing Service Providers who are Related Parties; and
  2. Existing (vested and unvested) holdings of TCR tokens.

I wish to declare the following conflicts of interest:

  1. Nil.

Interpretation

Unless otherwise defined in this offer, all terms beginning with a capital letter which are defined in the Participation Agreement have the same meaning unless the context otherwise requires.

Copyright Waiver

Copyright and related rights to this Proposal are waived pursuant to CC0 1 1 1.

Consensus check
  • Accept GFP → Growth Fund Managers accept
  • Reject GFP

0 voters

1 Like

Interesting proposal and directly competing with the Bankless guys.

What interests you specifically about this role and what added value would you bring specifically to the Tracer community? Do you already have ideas on how to grow the community, acquire new users, attract volume, etc? What growth efforts have you done in the past and what results have you achieved?

I think this again highlights the need to have a process to onboard contributors without having to make significant long term commitments for each contributor and creating a governance discussion.

I propose a system, similar to what works great in Index Coop (and other DAOs), where on a monthly basis contributors are paid based on their work. Pay people based on their value, not some agreement made via gov vote.

Example of their payouts:

1 Like

Hey @Robdog the overhead in this could work against good governance, it it permissioned each month and requires a concentrated governance event from a distributed governance structure. Even in centralised hierarchal structures, the impost (time and emotional) can be significant and lead to the lower cognitive burden of status quo. Once you go past a certain number of service providers, the time and effort cost to the principal to monitor and approve the agent overwhelms the potential agency cost (as it real and actual cost versus potential cost).

A framework for Governance Breakdown Structure into focus areas can help, but maybe is antithetical to the blockchain/community. (I think it has to happen for engaged DAOs past a certain size - evolutionary biology is already expressed in the DAO structure).

How about a process which is already catered for in the template proposal? The proposal template activates power to the Objection Mechanism, versus the Approval Mechansism. At any point, the DAO can amend or terminate the service agreement.

This way DAO members can act as Sensors, versus Gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are bottlenecks and typically only catch damage after the fact, whereas Sensors are navigators/lookouts and identify and steer the organisation away from damage as well as identify and steer the organisation towards opportunities. Influence versus Control is the sustainable way to grow decentralised organisations.

DAO members will gravitate to certain outcome areas, and will take an interest in how and where the resources of the DAO are being applied. Maybe there does needs to be more visibility into the outcomes of the proposals, maybe there does need some organisation around a Sensing function; a process to flag and resolve any tensions which arise in regards to the performance of the service providers. There are some pretty solid organisation governance methodologies (and technologies) out there which can support this.

Community requires trust, and checking and approving the commitment of a person every month does not engender trust. It is a case of “Don’t Trust and Approve”. I come from the angle that a service provider becomes part of the DAO/community.

Trust but Verify is famous - but really I prefer Trust and Confirm. I think it achieves the same assurance outcome but allows strength and momentum to build in the relationship.

And that’s my philosophic 2tcr worth!!

1 Like

Hey @jme , thank you for the thoughtful feedback. Just to reply to a few points:

True you introduce some centralization, however, it also significantly reduces overheads, there are clear guidelines for how different work will be valued and it came about as a result of a community decision and can easily be disbanded if the community dislikes it. Anyone can also contest all decisions which goes through an appeals process (though fairly rare).

I think creating several one year contracts for part time contributions, through community vote, that are in not really enforceable is not a viable path forward. Imo it works a lot better to reward part time contributors for their actual work and then have a core team with a fixed contract. This way we can with less overheads onboard more contributors and not have to worry about a bunch of open ended commitments costing us a fortune and having to be managed.

2 Likes